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1. Introduction
According to the received way of dividing up the study of linguistic sounds, phonetics 
investigates the low-level properties of speech, whereas phonology is concerned with the way 
speech sounds are organized in a language. The division of labor is set roughly as follows. 
Phonetics produces an inventory of speech sound types or “phones” individuated according to 
their articulatory and acoustic characteristics. Phonology describes how the sound systems of 
individual languages group the elements of this inventory into patterns of functional sameness 
and difference (Davenport and Hannahs 2013). For example, phonetics categorizes the speech 
sound type instantiated by the burst of breath that accompanies the release or the closure of an 
obstruent consonant as an “aspiration”, and symbolizes it as [ h]. Phonology proceeds to clarify 
whether in a given language the presence of aspiration is contrastive, or aspirated consonants are
allophones in complementary distribution with their unaspirated counterparts. In English, the 
speech sound types [t] and [th] are perceived as instances of the same phonological element /t/ 
and do not mark lexical distinctions: [teɪst] and [tʰeɪst] are both acceptable pronunciations of 
‘taste’ (though the latter is preferred by natives). In Hindi, by contrast, the speech sound types 
[p] and [ph] are perceived as instances of two distinct phonemes /p/ and /ph/, and their alternation
is lexically contrastive: [pəl] and [phəl] correspond to two different words, ‘pal’ and ‘phal’, 
meaning “moment” and “fruit”, respectively.
A key assumption underlying this approach to linguistic sounds, formalized by classical 
post-SPE phonology (SPE = The Sound Pattern of English, Chomsky and Halle 1968) and 
derived from earlier feature theories (Jakobson, Fant and Halle 1952; Hockett 1955) is what we 
can call the Phone Principle (PP). PP can be stated as follows.
(PP) Speech can be modeled as a series of discrete sound units drawn from a universal 
phonetic inventory.
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This assumption goes back to the earliest serious investigations of language. From Panini’s 
grammar of Classical Sanskrit, which operated on discrete segments of speech, to Halle’s (1954)
“phonemic strategy”, Hockett’s (1960) “duality of patterning”, and most contemporary theories 
of phonetics and phonology, PP has consistently represented one of the most basic 
methodological principles of our inquiries into the sound structure of human languages (see 
Raimy and Cairns 2015). The idea that connected speech is structured into letter-like segments 
(e.g., concatenations of consonants and vowels) is at the same time so intuitive and such a 
fundamental part of the way we theorize about language, that its assumption is often completely 
implicit, and its tenability seldom discussed in any critical fashion.
Yet, the evidence for PP is conflicting, and nowadays the principle is by no means 
uncontested. Morphophonemic and lexical phenomena speak strongly in its favor, but some 
psycholinguistic and acoustic data raise concerns about its soundness. Building on these 
opposing results, PP has been called into question by eliminativist views of the phone concept.1 
Taking issue with the received phonetic agreement, such approaches have claimed that we 
should refrain from characterizing spoken utterances as series of discrete sound units drawn 
from a universal phonetic inventory. A mature or complete linguistic phonetics should eliminate 
phones and model speech as an unsegmented continuum with properties to be expressed in 
purely quantitative-parametric terms. This raises an overarching question: what sort of claims 
1 Nota bene: the labels ‘eliminativism’ and ‘eliminativist’ are nowhere to be found in the phonetic literature. 
However, as will rapidly become clear, the anti-PP arguments we will consider can be safely filed under the 
philosophical rubric of eliminativism, as their main claim is that the phone concept is unsuited for sustained 
theorizing about the properties of connected speech and the dynamics of speech processing, and thus should be 
eliminated from linguistic theory (by analogy, think of the brand of eliminativism about the species concept 
discussed by Ereshefsky 1998).
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can be made about the status of phones and about PP’s ability to generate adequate theories of 
the organization of speech?
This paper has a broad rationale and a specific purpose. The broad rationale is to draw 
attention on a branch of the study of language which appears to raise major methodological 
questions (in this case: in what sense and to what extent is it possible to appeal to PP in the 
scientific description of speech and speech processing?), questions that are at the center of a 
lively debate among linguists, and nonetheless have been mostly neglected by philosophers of 
science (see, however, Appelbaum 1999; Bromberger and Halle 2000; Wetzel 2009; Carr 2012). 
There is relatively little existing work in the philosophy of linguistics (Scholz, Pelletier and 
Pullum 2016), and the attention that philosophers have dedicated to phonetics is even more 
marginal. I hope to be able to show that this discipline harbors a number of foundational 
questions that deserve deeper philosophical scrutiny.2
The specific purpose is to unpack the claims underlying PP, characterize the eliminativist 
arguments against them, and lay out a first informed assessment of the prospects of PP in light of
the eliminativist arguments. The take-home message I will defend is that the eliminativist line of
thinking does force us to reexamine our grounds for accepting the phone methodology, but fails 
to show that the phone concept should be eliminated from linguistic theory.
The discussion will proceed as follows. Section 2 will break PP down into three specific 
claims (Discreteness, Universality, and Computationalism) and introduce the eliminativist 
objection against each. Section 3 will respond to the eliminativist argument against Discreteness.
2 Along the way, the reader should also notice that the issue of the tenability of PP presents obvious points of 
contact with mainstream debates in philosophy of science, from classical work on the analog-digital divide in 
cognition (Dretske 1981), to more recent work on the nature of scientific models (e.g., Weisberg 2013), the 
semantics of scientific theories (e.g., Azzouni 2010), and the admissibility of idealization in science (e.g., Elgin 
2017; Potochnik 2017).
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Section 4 will respond to the eliminativist argument against Universality. Section 5 will respond 
to the eliminativist argument against Computationalism. Section 6 will conclude.
2. Digital Phonetics
We can get a clearer understanding of the specific claims underlying PP by means of a 
concrete example. Consider a normal utterance of the word ‘taste’. According to proponents of 
PP, we can claim what follows.
a) Utterances of ‘taste’ can be described as concatenations of the sound segments [th], [e], 
[ɪ], [s], and [t].
b) The segments [th], [e], [ɪ], [s], and [t] instantiate each an individual speech sound type or 
“phone” represented in a universally available phonetic inventory (IPA 1999).
c) Utterances of ‘taste’ are processed in speech perception by association to discrete mental 
symbols corresponding to [th], [e], [ɪ], [s], and [t], and discreteness at the level of 
phonetic representation guarantees discreteness at the higher levels of grammatical 
processing.
Abstracting from the ‘taste’ example, PP can thus be decomposed into the following three claims
(cf. Kenstowicz 1994; Laver 1994; Ladd 2011).
(Discreteness) Speech can be described as the concatenation of discrete sound segments.
(Universality) Speech can be described as the concatenation of a finite set of speech 
sound types picked from a universally available phonetic inventory.
(Computationalism) Real-time speech processing can be described as the manipulation of 
discrete phone-sized mental symbols.
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Discreteness and Universality argue for the viability of phone-based descriptions of the physical 
makeup of connected speech, and therefore make a claim about the organization of speech 
specifically. Computationalism argues for the viability of phone-based descriptions of the 
information manipulated by listeners in speech processing tasks, and therefore makes a claim 
about the nature of the mental representation of speech.
For illustration, here is how speech processing is understood to operate for those 
subscribing to Discreteness, Universality, and Computationalism (cf. Hale and Reiss 2008). 
Speech is emitted by a speaker, it spreads through an elastic medium (air), and reaches a listener.
Here it generates a raw auditory percept, which stores information about the speech signal and 
the other sounds present in the environment. The raw auditory percept is then broken down into 
its sub-components. The operation involves first isolating the aspects of the raw auditory percept
which are due specifically to the speech signal (as opposed to, say, the sound of the washing 
machine in the background), and then withdrawing from this body of speech-specific 
information data about voice quality, the speaker’s emotional state, the linguistic content of the 
utterance, and the like. Subsequently, the information about the linguistic content of the 
utterance is “printed” into a speech score. This is transmitted to a parser, which breaks the 
speech score into sound segments, analyzes their physical characteristics, pairs them to a mental 
symbol, and outputs a phonetic score (e.g., [th]-[e]-[ɪ]-[s]-[t]). The phonetic score is a 
concatenation of digital mental symbols which is readable at the interface with phonology and 
feeds the additional processes required to perform higher-order tasks such as word recognition 
and semantic interpretation.
This is the orthodox story. Even Optimality Theory (Prince and Smolensky 2004), a now 
mainstream approach to phonology whose view of phonological grammar diverges significantly 
from the classical SPE codification, continues to assume that the phonological component of the 
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grammar computes digital representations captured by the phone concept, and that the linear 
string is cut into a number of chunks or segments that delineate the application of phonological 
processes (Lombardi 2001). However, in the last couple of decades, in good part following the 
emergence of laboratory phonology (Kingston and Beckman 1990), mainstream assumptions 
about the descriptive legitimacy of PP-style phonetics have come under increasing scrutiny, and 
have been called into question.
To be sure, contemporary phonetics and phonology abound with controversies about 
central conceptual tenets of these disciplines (Dunbar and Idsardi 2010), and stances opposing 
PP or casting doubts on its viability hardly make up a uniform front. Reactions have ranged from
Klatt’s (1979) early work on power spectra, to the exemplar theory of Goldinger (1996), to 
articulatory phonology (Browman and Goldstein 1992), to the full-blooded rejection of formal 
phonology championed by Port and Leary (2005) and Port (2007a). However, it seems fair to 
say that these different approaches share, in different ways and degrees, an overarching 
conceptual thrust: PP-style phonetics is not an accurate way of looking at the acoustic realization
of language and at the mental representation of speech. The models of speech and of the mental 
representation of speech produced on the basis of the phone idealization should be eliminated 
and replaced by a descriptive framework making no appeal to phones.
Call this Phone Eliminativism (PE). Parallel to PP, PE can be formulated as follows.
(PE) Speech cannot be modeled as a series of discrete sound units drawn from a 
universal phonetic inventory.
Again parallel to PP, PE can be decomposed into the following three claims.
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(Anti-Discreteness) Speech cannot be described as the concatenation of discrete 
sound segments.
(Anti-Universality) Speech cannot be described as the concatenation of a finite set of 
speech sound types picked from a universal phonetic inventory.
(Anti-Computationalism) Real-time speech processing cannot be described as the 
manipulation of discrete phone-sized mental symbols.
Anti-Discreteness and Anti-Universality insist on the absence of a well-behaved 
correspondence between PP-style phonetic transcriptions and concrete speech. They maintain 
that a careful observation of the low-level properties of connected speech reveals that it is 
unsuited to be characterized as a concatenation of segments instantiating universally available 
phonetic types. Support to this conclusion includes the notorious imprecision of phonetic 
transcriptions, effects of coarticulation (absence of clear boundaries between segments), the 
noisy nature of speech, evidence that individual phones are implemented by different languages 
through acoustically dissimilar sound configurations, the displacement of acoustic cues for 
individual segments across the entire signal, and the presence in the speech signal of 
phonologically relevant timing elements that resist translation into discrete symbols (Fodor, 
Bever and Garrett 1972; Liberman 1996; Gafos 2002).
Anti-Computationalism argues that there is no stage in speech processing properly 
describable as the translation of speech into chains of phone-like mental symbols, and draws the 
epistemological moral that the phone concept is unsuited to psychological theorizing (Port 
2010). Instead of viewing speech perception as a routine based on the manipulation of symbolic 
phonetic scores, real-time speech analysis should be modeled within a dynamic-embodied 
framework of the sort introduced by van Gelder (1995), Kelso (1995), and Clark (1997).
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Can PP respond to these challenges? And if so, how so? The answer plausibly hinges on 
the possibility of producing a version of Discreteness, Universality, and Computationalism that 
reasserts the phone methodology while taking into account the best instances of the eliminativist
line of thinking. The key, I will submit, lies in committing to PP as a hypothesis about the level 
up to which the phone methodology is conducive to sound generalizations about the physical 
makeup and the cognitive organization of speech, and in construing PE as a pointer to the upper 
boundary of PP’s explanatory power.
3. Discreteness
Let us start with Anti-Discreteness: speech cannot be described as the concatenation of 
discrete sound segments. There are two basic ways of construing Anti-Discreteness. One is to 
read it as the claim that the phone idealization cannot generate reliable descriptions of the 
physical makeup of connected speech, which is essentially continuous, and thereby should be 
eliminated on the basis of its base-level ontological inadequacy. The other is to read it as the 
claim that PP-style descriptions of connected speech are too coarse-grained and arbitrary to lead 
to dependable models of the physical organization of utterances, and thereby should be 
eliminated because the way they idealize speech cannot constitute the premise of adequate (non-
ontological) theorizing.
The ontology-driven interpretation of Anti-Discreteness can be neutralized quite easily. 
Whether or not strings of phones allow for an exhaustive description of the physical makeup of 
speech is irrelevant to the explanatory interests at issue within linguistic phonetics, and 
proponents of Discreteness are certainly not committed to it as a posit of fine-grained descriptive
ontology (i.e., to the notion that the phonetic vocabulary tracks measurable or observable entities
in the external world). What matters, much more practically, is whether modeling speech as a 
sequence of phones allows us to render it tractable relative to the explanatory goals of linguistic 
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theory. For example, Port and Leary (2005) are certainly right in stressing that atemporal phones
are constitutively unsuited to be found in a temporal signal, no matter how meticulously 
analyzed. But from this simple premise, the case for Anti-Discreteness does not take off. The 
commitment to an analog ontology for speech (i.e., utterances are continua which are not 
materially divided into discrete phonetic units) is fully compatible with the claim that utterances 
are continua with gradient internal discontinuities (e.g., alternating degrees of energy and 
sonority) which become scientifically tractable only once modeled as concatenations of discrete 
phones (cf. Lieberman and Blumstein 1988).3
As for the second interpretation of Anti-Discreteness, it is useful to illustrate the point with
an example (from Lodge 2009). Consider a standard utterance of the word ‘bed’. It is supposed 
to contain three segments: [b], [e], and [d]. Yet, advocates of Anti-Discreteness insist, this 
characterization fails to account for some crucial asymmetries between the physical parameters 
operating within the purported segments, which are themselves temporally complex. Voicing 
starts after the bilabial closure and ceases before the final release of the alveolar closure. 
Furthermore, the tongue is already transitioning to the position required to articulate [e] before 
the completion of bilabial closure. Thus, the initial stages of a typical utterance of ‘bed’ 
encompass at least the following events:4
3 Incidentally, recall that even the discourse domains of highly reductive disciplines such as macro-physics 
include objects that do not reflect or only “obliquely reflect” the ontological commitments of their practitioners 
(Azzouni 2010). We treat Mars as a point-mass and as a homogeneous spheroid because this allows us to 
formulate efficient predictions about Mars’s gravitational effects on neighboring planets, even if the notions of 
point-mass and homogeneous spheroid hardly pick out anything we would define as “existing” or “real” in our 
metaphysical moments.
4 I am glossing over the fact that for many speakers of English utterance-initial voiced stops like /b/ are actually 
voiceless throughout the period of bilabial closure and voicing does not begin until 10-15 ms after the release of
the closure. In such cases, the contrast between utterance-initial /b/ and utterance-initial /p/ is manifested in the 
fact that in /p/ voicing does not begin until after an aspiration (usually 50 ms or more after the release of the 
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 i) the tongue transitions to the position needed for the vocalization of [e];
ii) bilabial closure occurs;
iii) voicing starts;
iv) after the build-up of pressure above the glottis, bilabial closure is released;
v) [e] is vocalized.
The temporal distribution of the parameters involved can be represented with a simplified 
variant of the notation used in articulatory phonology, as in figure 1.
Figure 1
Instead of being arranged into a linear sequence, the parameters evolve independently and 
overlap in a complex way here, one that casts doubt on the supposed naturalness of cross-
parametric phones. The segments [b], [e] and [d] do not emerge “transparently” from the chart 
(Fowler 2015), and the theorist is left free to choose their exact positioning. But if the exact 
closure). The situation, hence, is a bit more complex than what I am explicitly recognizing here, but this does 
not affect the argument. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this point.
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localization of the phones involved cannot be but the result of an active deliberation on the 
theorist’s part, how can we trust PP in its ability to inform reliable theorizing?
Let us grant that a 1:1-scale description of the structural information represented in the 
chart would not appeal to [b], [e] and [d]. Still, it appears that turning the example into a case 
against Discreteness would require more effort. To start, even if the notation used to represent 
the temporal evolution of the parameters does not resort to cross-parametric phones, it 
nonetheless cuts up the speech continuum in a segmental way, as the representation is still 
committed to the existence of discontinuities at the positions (i)-(iv). For example, the temporal 
interval between (ii) and (iii) delineates a chunk eligible to be picked out by a segmental 
vocabulary because it is preceded and followed by two intervals in which bilabial closure is 
absent and voicing is present, respectively. 
Second, the impossibility of identifying without a deliberate theoretical decision where, 
e.g., the segment [b] is positioned does not seem to imply that any attempt to describe utterances
of ‘bed’ as containing a [b] unit is hopeless, precisely because the discontinuities at (i)-(iv) make
the decision possible. Once we posit that [b] is instantiated whenever the articulators and the 
speech signal exhibit the familiar set of signature features (manner of articulation: occlusive; 
place of articulation: bilabial; phonation: voiced), we can coherently deliberate that [b] is 
instantiated between (iii) and (iv), which happens to be the only interval of time where both 
[Bilabial occlusion] and [Voicing] are present. Accordingly, we can coherently deliberate that 
our utterance of ‘bed’ starts at (iii), at that the events occurring before the discontinuity at (iii) 
simply prepare the actual utterance.
A potentially more serious issue is that the exact temporal location of the discontinuities 
(i)-(iv) themselves is fuzzy. For example, the rearrangement of the lips from the occlusion of [b] 
to the position at the center of [e] occupies a non-null interval of time (typically between 60 and 
100 ms): (iv) can be arbitrarily placed at any location within this delta. However, the 
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classificatory elasticity licensed by the vagueness of these boundaries does not imply that the 
distinction between [b] and [e] is entirely artifactual, since it is constrained by the macroscopic 
variation in parameter values occurring with the time flow. To express the point with an analogy 
familiar to philosophers, using the temporal fuzziness of the discontinuity at (iv) as an argument 
against describing the signal as segmented into [b] and [e] would be close to maintaining that the
inability to exactly locate the beginning of the Seine is proof that the Seine is not an objective 
whole (cf. Varzi 2011). The evidence does imply that the segments in question can enjoy an 
individuality only as a result of a fiat: their “objectivity” is independently enforced by the broad 
transitions in parameter values highlighted by the chart, whereas their “individuality” depends 
on an active theoretical decision on our part. However, this appears sufficient to warrant the 
operational division into phones called for by Discreteness. Speech signals are continua 
structured into objective, gradiently alternating regions that can be represented by convention as 
concatenations of phones for the purposes of efficient theoretical treatment.
4. Universality
Let us now turn to Anti-Universality. This horn of PE builds on the observation that phones
like [b], [e], and [d] are implemented in different languages and phonetic contexts through 
speech sounds having highly, sometimes radically different physical and articulatory 
characteristics. This seems to jeopardize Universality’s project of capturing the almost unlimited
diversity of speech production by relying on the fixed catalog of phones familiar to users of the 
IPA. I shall discuss two main variants or aspects of the issue: the Variability Problem and the 
Locality Problem.
The Variability Problem arises from the difference in physical characteristics between the 
acoustic configurations supposedly implementing the same phonetic elements in different 
languages. For example, the VOT (voice onset time) values for [p] and [b] vary noticeably 
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across languages, even across dialectal variants of the same language, such as standard French 
and Quebec French (Caramazza and Yeni-Komshian 1974). Similarly, the phones grouped under
English /i/ are usually higher and more front than those falling under Spanish /i/, whereas the 
sounds corresponding to Spanish /u/ are closer than English /u/ to cardinal /u/ (Bradlow 1995). 
The same goes for the durational reflexes of post-vocalic /s/-/z/ in French and English (Flege 
and Hillenbrand 1986).
The Locality Problem lies in the fact that distinctive features often “bleed” outside their 
target position and affect the acoustic implementation of speech sounds in their neighborhood 
(Beckman and Edwards 2010). For example, in words like ‘butting’ and ‘budding’ the phonemes
/t/ and /d/ should both be “neutralized” into a flap. This is reflected in the standard practice of 
notating the speech sounds produced in the middle of both words as [ɾ]. However, the acoustic 
configurations actually generated in the production of the two segments are not physically 
symmetric, because the /t/ of ‘butting’ is systematically implemented by native speakers of 
American English as a phone oddly in between an alveolar flap, the segment’s expected acoustic
implementation in a neutralizing context, and an alveolar stop, the segment’s canonical 
realization in non-neutralizing contexts. Yet, subjects presented with minimal pairs like 
‘budding’ vs. ‘butting’ appear able to set them apart better than chance. This indicates, plausibly,
that the features identifying the neutralized segment are in fact outside the position it is taken to 
occupy in standard phonetic transcriptions, and reside in the preceding vowel (Fox and Terbeek 
1977; cf. Kleber, John and Harrington 2010 for data about German).5
5 Likewise, Kelly and Local (1986) observe that in Standard Southern British English syllable-onset /l/ (realized 
as a clear palatal) and syllable-onset /r/ (realized as a dark palatal) yield resonance effects that color the entire 
syllable of which they are part (e.g., the /i/ of ‘Henry’ is darker than the /i/ of ‘Henley’) and may modify the 
acoustic characteristics of vowels even at 2-3 syllables of distance. Importantly, these non-local cues can be 
used by listeners to identify lexical /l/ and /r/. This suggests that long-domain co-articulatory information about 
the /l/-/r/ distinction is available to listeners outside the particulate position purportedly occupied by the 
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Let us see how Universality can react. The Variability Problem can be mitigated in two 
immediate ways. A first strategy would be to increase the acoustic granularity of the inventory of
phones available to transcriptions. On this solution, for example, the 3-4 VOT value types 
originally envisioned by Chomsky and Halle (1968) would be raised to the number of values 
required to account for the entire scope of the VOT targets exploited for lexical contrast in 
known languages, the speech sounds implementing Spanish /i/ and English /i/ would be paired to
different phones, and the issue of cross-linguistic variability would dissolve. One might worry 
that an excessively fine-grained and rich inventory of phones would run the risk of rendering 
speech as hard to describe as it would be if it were assumed to be continuous, thus undermining 
the purported explanatory advantage of adopting the segmental framework. But to the best of my
knowledge, there is no principled reason to suspect that the expansion at stake would necessarily
have the proportions required to jeopardize the base-level assumption of a fixed inventory of 
phones.6
A second, possibly more sophisticated strategy would be to keep the phonetic catalog at its 
current size (160+ items) and assign each different language or dialect a specific set of fine-
grained acoustic realizers for the basic phonetic arsenal. The move could be implemented by 
proposing that individual languages and dialects are, among other things, functions mapping the 
segment (West 1999), and hence that the alleged phone is in fact “distributed” in a region extending far beyond 
the boundaries of a single sound segment.
6 An instructive parallel can perhaps be made with the domain of phoneme inventories. According to the most 
conservative estimates of the size of the vowel inventory of Modern German, it comprises less than ten 
phonemes. This assumption is challenged by more liberal estimates, which allow up to almost twenty phonemes
(Wiese 2000). Theories of the sound structure of German positing a rich vowel inventory, however, converge 
with their conservative counterparts on the methodology of minimal pairs as a criterion for determining 
phonemic status and on the utility of phonemes in the study of sound structure. Likewise, it should be possible 
to debate on the appropriate size of the phonetic inventory (and, e.g., argue for a richer catalog of phones) while
remaining within the conceptual framework of PP.
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phonetic alphabet to loci in Speech Space, conceived of as the collection of all sound 
configurations capable of being generated by an idealized human vocal apparatus. On this basis, 
one could further argue that each language comes with a proprietary vocabulary of speech sound
types, that each specific speech sound type corresponds to a distinctive position in Speech 
Space, and that the same phone may be realized in two languages through acoustic 
configurations corresponding to two different positions in Speech Space. Of course, the issue 
would remain of giving a precise account of the conditions to be met in order for two speech 
sound types (or loci in Speech Space) to be viewed as instances of the same phone, given that 
the classification no longer runs on sameness in low-level properties. A weaker, counterpart-
inspired notion of similarity could do the job. In any case, a response to the Variability Problem 
running along these lines is certainly open and should be evaluated with due attention before 
jumping to the conclusion that Universality is bound to collapse.
The Locality Problem can be addressed by insisting on the specific explanatory work that 
the phone methodology is designed to perform, which is essentially grouping under general 
type-categories chunks of speech that share a sufficient amount of signature functional-
constitutive properties while differing, even systematically, at the level of acoustic detail. We 
mentioned that coarticulation and coloring effects seem in principle inconsistent with the idea 
that speech may be usefully described as the concatenation of discrete elements having a stable 
set of low-level properties. However, coarticulation and coloring (and the evidence of their role 
in establishing hypotheses about the lexical form conveyed by a chunk of speech) do not 
obliterate the basic acoustic blueprint of the segments involved. Stevens (1989) discusses a 
relevant example. Place the tongue against your upper teeth and produce [s]. Keep the shape of 
the tongue constant and slowly move it towards the back of palate. You should notice 
(irrespective of your sound system of reference) that after a relatively long interval where the 
movement of the tongue has no categorial effect, there is an abrupt transition to [ʃ], followed by 
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another steady state in which the movement of the tongue does not alter phonetic category. Thus,
in the experiment we can distinguish three phases, labeled for convenience A, B, and C, and 
evolving as intuitively illustrated in figure 2.
    
Figure 2
Phases A and C mark intervals where change in articulation and acoustic features correlate 
with a stable perceptual state. Phase B individuates a quantal region where small changes in the 
state of the articulators correspond to an abrupt change in phonetic category. The important point
is that while in B small variations in the state of the articulators are relevant for determining 
whether the acoustic output belongs to [s] or [ʃ], throughout A and C phonetic typing remains 
constant across a wide range of articulatory configurations. For example, the acoustic output is 
stably classifiable as [s] for the whole temporal delta in which the tongue hits positions ranging 
from the front teeth to, approximately, the middle of the alveolar ridge. In such an interval, there 
are both change in observable acoustic properties (the counterpart of coloring and coarticulation 
in our example) and steadiness at the level of phonetic class.
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Another example. We know that the primary acoustic cue for [d] in the syllable /di/ is a 
rising second-formant transition, while the [d] in the syllable /du/ is signaled by a falling second-
formant transition (Liberman et al. 1967). We also know that a single burst of noise at a 
frequency of 1440 Hz is heard as a [p] if followed by [i] and as a [k] if followed by [a] 
(Liberman, Delattre and Cooper 1952). In the [d] case, there is an acoustic incongruity that is 
disregarded in phonetic interpretation.7 In the second example, there is an acoustic congruity (the
burst at 1440 Hz) that somehow gives rise to a difference in phonetic categorization. But our 
definition of the membership criteria for [d] and, consequently, our notion of [d]-ness can be 
suitably complex. For example, the [d] case can be reconciled with Universality if the criteria for
[d]-ness are tentatively defined as follows.
([d]-ness) x, if {(rising second-formant transition)x and (followed by[i])x} or {(falling ∀x, if {(rising second-formant transition)x and (followed by[i])x} or {(falling 
second-formant transition)x and (followed by[u])x}, then [d]x.
In short, the fact that real-time phonetic categorization computes non-local parameters is far 
from obviously inconsistent with PP. The phenomenon does prove that the conditions that a 
micro-interval of speech must meet to be classified as an instance of a phone are sensitive to 
broader characteristics of the speech environment and respond to complex constraints (that we 
should try to uncover and formalize). But not that there are no possible versions of Universality 
clever enough to maintain the phone idealization while acknowledging the facts inspiring the 
formulation of the Locality Problem.
7 To be sure, the acoustic incongruity at work here is systematic, since the two second-formant transitions point 
to a common frequency locus. However, the point remains: the two consonants themselves have little in 
common in terms of observable low-level features. For more on the notion of “frequency locus”, see, e.g., 
Harrington (2010).
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We can thus reiterate our initial methodological pledge. Variation in acoustic detail and 
non-locality effects do not seem to invalidate the basic tenet that speech sounds can be viewed as
organized into a system of types reproduced by an appropriately large and appropriately 
sensitive inventory of phones. Speech consists of a continuum whose internal structure can be 
usefully modeled as a concatenation of segments, and such segments, in turn, can be usefully 
viewed as instances of elements from an appropriately fine-grained, cross-linguistically 
available inventory of phones.
5. Computationalism
We now turn to Anti-Computationalism. As we have seen, this horn of PE argues that there
is no stage in real-time speech processing describable as the recovery of strings of discrete 
phones. Instead of viewing speech perception as a routine based on the manipulation of 
symbolic phonetic scores, real-time speech analysis should be modeled within a dynamic-
embodied framework of the sort introduced by van Gelder (1995), Kelso (1995), and Clark 
(1997). For proponents of Anti-Computationalism, the key motivation for this claim is that 
speech contains gradient information that resists symbolic transduction while yet being causally 
relevant to the recovery of linguistic form. Contra PP, Anti-Computationalists maintain that the 
attractiveness and apparent naturalness of phone-based accounts of the cognitive representation 
of speech are a figment of the combined pressure of three factors: a) alphabetic literacy; b) the 
so-called “particulate principle”; c) phonological theory.
As for (a), the argument is that our putatively natural ability to segment speech into phones
and the theoretical program of PP itself are byproducts of alphabetic training. In other words, 
literacy in alphabetic writing biases us into reasoning about speech processing in digital terms, 
and we simply reiterate the mistake in our efforts to produce scientific phonetics (Read et al. 
1986; Faber 1993; Silverman 2006; Port 2007b; Cowley 2011).
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As for (b), the argument is that virtually all work in mainstream formal linguistics runs on 
the implicit assumption that natural languages are complex systems arranging primitive particles
on multiple levels of organization. It is no coincidence that the strongest rationale for the 
psychological reality of phones comes from the levels of linguistic representation posited to 
explain phenomena such as word‐formation processes. Words are built from morpheme 
particles, morphemes are built from phoneme particles, so phonemes should be built from sound
particles (e.g., Studdert-Kennedy 1998). Yet, according to advocates of Anti-Computationalism, 
this is just a systematic desideratum for which we have no real independent argument.
As for (c), the argument is that the issues surrounding the computational-symbolic nature 
of speech processing have always been framed in line with PP because phonetic representations 
are supposed to provide the input to phonological processes. Insofar as one accepts that 
phonemes are mentally real categories which pattern the phonetic space in classes of “lexically 
equivalent” phones, the psychological reality of phones seems to follow by formal necessity 
(Ohala 1992). But once again, belief in Computationalism is just a misleading consequence of 
the methodological desiderata (and of the ill-placed psychological ambitions) of formal 
phonology, not an attitude warranted by objective features of the language-speech interface itself
(Archangeli and Pulleyblank 1994; Shockey 2003). The theoretical vocabulary of PP-style 
phonetics may well suit the descriptive constraints of mainstream phonology (and semantics, 
and syntax), but it is remote from the vocabulary one would need to talk about the actual 
properties of the mental representation of speech (van der Hulst 2003).
Let us try to respond. To start, Computationalism need not assume that the analog-to-
digital conversion involved in the preparation of phonetic scores is a process which samples 
chunks of auditory representation, analyzes their content, and serially pairs them to a symbol in 
the phonetic string. The working assumption is that the reanalysis of the acoustic landscape 
eventually inputted to the phonological machinery can be characterized via the phone concept. 
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But nothing in the assumption is committed to conceiving the preparation of phonetic scores as a
one-to-one mechanical process serially converting bits of auditory representations into phonetic 
symbols, with no sensitivity to suprasegmental or idiosyncratic features involved. As it turns out,
most contemporary accounts reject the view that the recovery of phonetic representations is an 
either/or phenomenon where symbolic computation and non-symbolic processing are mutually 
exclusive (Luce and McLennan 2005). For example, it has been proposed that the properties of 
the speech signal that resist symbolic transduction might operate as attractors or constraints on 
the concatenation of phone-sized symbols eventually inputted to phonological calculus or, 
alternatively, be processed by separate non-symbolic units of processing running in parallel with
the symbolic core of phonetic and phonological computation (Pisoni and Levi 2007; Hall 2015). 
In short, the evidence that non-symbolic factors play a role in early speech perception can be 
accounted for within frameworks according to which the backbone of early speech perception is 
symbolic and can be modeled on the basis of the phone concept.8
So far for the claim that early speech perception cannot be entirely reduced to the serial 
transduction of chunks of speech into phone-like mental symbols. As for the claim that early 
speech processing is completely unfit to be described as a phone-manipulating machinery, we 
have seen that according to prominent advocates of Anti-Computationalism real-time speech 
8 The claim that symbolic and non-symbolic processing may coexist and cooperate in speech perception is not 
unheard of even within formal phonology. Approaches such as Bybee’s (2001) frequency phonology, according 
to which the acoustic details of specific instances of speech are retained in phonological representations, appear
able to incorporate the data emphasized by fans of Anti-Computationalism while remaining committed to the 
intervention of symbolic representations in speech processing. Pierrehumbert (2003) adds that although the 
conception of phonology as a machinery operating on phone-sized variables is often assumed to stand in 
opposition to the idea that the phonological grammar runs on statistical knowledge, this opposition is a spurious
one, since probability theory assigns probability distributions to variables, and without variables (i.e., PP-style 
segments), there would be no way for a statistical learning model to tabulate any statistics about anything.
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analysis should be modeled following a dynamically-oriented approach to cognition (van Gelder
and Port 1995; Port and Leary 2005). There are two immediate issues here. The first is that the 
criticisms to symbol-processing models advanced by van Gelder (1995) and affiliates, however 
sound, do not generalize easily to the informationally complex domains of speech perception 
and production (see Markman and Dietrich 2000). The second issue is that a number of 
phenomena in speech perception and production appear extremely difficult to account for 
without some synthesis of feature properties at the phone level, and seem to require a mental 
machinery operating on phone-sized representations. This includes phoneme-restoration effects 
(Warren 1970), phoneme detection in non-words (Foss and Gernsbacher 1983), data on 
misperceptions of fluent speech involving single segments (Bond 2005), single-segment errors 
in speech production (Fromkin 1980), the perception of illusory segments inside illegal 
consonant clusters (Dupoux et al. 2011), and the existence of language games based on the 
insertion, deletion, or movement of a sound sequence (Vaux 2011).
Finally, the argument from alphabetic literacy: we find it so natural to conceive of speech 
processing as the recovery of a concatenation of phones only because we have been trained to 
read and write in a system involving the manipulation of alphabetic symbols, and our phonetic 
systems reproduce this pervasive illusion (Port 2007b). Now, it is true that our ability to report 
on the segmental structure of speech is greatly facilitated by literacy in alphabetic writing 
(Gillon 2004), and that subjects who do not master alphabetic orthography tend to be explicitly 
aware of- and able to manipulate only larger chunks of phonetic structure, such as its division in 
syllables (Morais, Alegria and Content 1987). The problem with the argument is that the 
evidence it relies on can be understood to support the opposite conclusion. For one thing, it 
seems that alphabetic systems could not have developed in the first place unless listeners, at 
some level, organized speech into minimal sound units. Otherwise, it would be natural to 
wonder why alphabetic writing is so widespread and has enjoyed such a far-reaching success in 
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the recent history of our species (Fowler 2010). Furthermore, available evidence about the 
difference in segmentation abilities between literates and non-literates in alphabetic systems 
seems to show only that alphabetism enhances preexisting segmentation abilities, not that it 
creates them ex nihilo (Brady and Shankweiler 2001). For example, Rozin and Gleitman (1977) 
present evidence that the development of the skills that allow children to analyze speech into 
minimal sound units is a prerequisite, rather than an effect, of the ability to read in alphabetic 
systems. Wan and Jaeger (1998) show that Mandarin speakers with little exposure to alphabetic 
writing produce speech errors with whole-segment deletions and metatheses. Similarly, Qu, 
Damian and Kazanina (2012) provide ERP data on Mandarin production giving support to the 
claim that letter-sized segments constitute fundamental units of phonological encoding even for 
speakers of languages that do not encode such units orthographically. It appears difficult to 
explain patterns of such a kind without assuming that some segmental organization of speech is 
cognitively available prior to alphabetic learning.
Once again: none of this proves once and for all that a completely reductive picture of the 
transition from physical speech to grammatical computation should be realist about an 
internalized phonetic transcriber which feeds strings of phones into phonology. We have no 
proof that our speech-grammar interface “actually runs on phones”. But what matters to 
Computationalism as a program in psychology is that PP generates empirically dependable and 
formally tractable approximations of the information flowing in the speech-grammar interface, 
not that concatenations of phones track the micro-ontology of the content feeding the transition 
between auditory and phonological processing. In other words, what matters is that we agree on 
the premise that by adopting the stance of PP we can generate viable characterizations of the 
content manipulated by the neurally implemented systems in charge of speech processing and 
production, even if we prefer to remain agnostic on the precise nature of the operations 
occurring at the underlying level, or, e.g., we believe that such operations are distributed patterns
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of activation in a PDP substrate which has nothing to do with phones (Smolensky, Goldrick and 
Mathis 2014). The issue is whether conceiving of the speech-grammar interface as computing 
strings of phones is conducive to sound generalizations about the makeup of our linguistic 
machinery given its observable outputs (cf. Carr 2000 on “weak realism”), not whether 
concatenations of phones give us the “raw”, metaphysically unfiltered picture of how our mind 
translates physical speech into a format amenable to higher-level grammatical processing. As far
as I can tell, this refined formulation of the psychological ambitions of PP remains motivated by 
a number of observable phenomena in speech processing, and none of the arrows in the anti-
computationalist quiver threatens it. Hence, Computationalism stands.
6. Conclusion
The paper has proceeded as follows. Section 1 introduced the division of labor between 
phonetics and phonology, formulated the Phone Principle (PP), and stated the aim of the 
discussion: assessing the prospects of PP in light of eliminativist views of the phone concept. 
Section 2 outlined the three main horns of PP (Discreteness, Universality, and 
Computationalism), summarized the motivations appearing to call for Phone Eliminativism 
(PE), and formulated the eliminativist objection against each of the three horns of PP (Anti-
Discreteness, Anti-Universality, and Anti-Computationalism). Section 3 tried to respond to the 
eliminativist argument against Discreteness. Section 4 tried to respond to the eliminativist 
argument against Universality. Section 5 tried to respond to the eliminativist argument against 
Computationalism.
The moral of the discussion is twofold. On the one hand, we should acknowledge the 
constructive role played by PE in reminding us that speech and speech processing are 
considerably more complex than one might think when looking at them thought the lenses of a 
naive understanding of PP.  Works interrogating the basic assumptions of linguistic phonetics are
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rare, and the proponents of PE have certainly the merit of stirring up a fair debate on the 
conceptual foundations of field. Questioning the legitimacy of PP gives us a welcome 
opportunity to reflect on its ability to provide serviceable characterizations of the physical 
organization of speech, on the functions it serves in the broader landscape of linguistic theory, 
and on its relationship to the psychology of speech processing. On the other hand, I believe that 
the empirical evidence and the theoretical considerations gathered so far by the supporters of PE 
fail to show that the phone concept should be eliminated from linguistic theory. In other words, I
believe we should be careful inferring, from the simple premise that a problematization of the 
phone concept is needed, the conclusion that linguistic phonetics should stop reasoning within 
the conceptual paradigm set by PP.
I hope this paper will contribute to raising awareness of the many foundational issues 
surfacing from contemporary phonetics, and will help stimulate critical inquiry into these areas 
among philosophers of science and philosophers interested in language more generally.
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